AI might end up a controlled substance

In the US, AI has become one of the least liked things in public life.

That is not a rhetorical flourish. In the NBC News poll from early March, just 26 percent of voters had a positive view of AI and 46 percent a negative one, a margin of almost two to one. Here is where this could be heading, and most of the industry is not ready for it. On current trends, AI ends up regulated like a controlled substance. Licensed at the source, metered by how much it consumes, capped where the physical limits bite. Not because of what it might think. Because of what it drinks and what it burns, and because voters can now feel both on their utility bill.

For two years the public argument about AI was theatrical. Superintelligence, extinction, the machine that wakes up. That fight was always going to stay abstract, because nobody gets a bill for it. The fight that decides AI’s future is duller and already half over. It is about kilowatts and gallons.

Start with the meter. The 2024 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report for the US Department of Energy puts data centers at about 4.4 percent of US electricity in 2023, heading to between 6.7 and 12 percent by 2028. In June, a UN University report projected that AI data centers will use roughly 9.3 trillion litres of water a year by 2030, the annual domestic water needs of 1.3 billion people. A single large site can draw up to 5 million gallons a day, the same as a town of 50,000. These are not projections about a model’s intelligence. They are projections about a town’s water table.

Then the politics. A cost you can see turns into a vote you can count. 78 percent of Americans worry that new data centers will push up their energy bills. An Economist and YouGov poll in May found over 70 percent think AI is moving too fast, and the split was almost even across parties, 68 percent of Republicans and 77 percent of Democrats. That last number is the one that matters. An issue this bipartisan does not fade after an election. It hardens into law.

And the law is already being written. In 2026, lawmakers in more than 30 states filed over 300 bills on data centers, from moratoriums to rules forcing operators to pay for their own power. More than 100 communities have enacted local moratoriums. In March, Senator Sanders and Representative Ocasio-Cortez introduced a federal bill to pause any data center drawing 20 megawatts or more until national safeguards exist. Notice the trigger. Not what the model can do. How much power it pulls. When you regulate a thing by metering its consumption and licensing its supply, you have stopped treating it as software. You are treating it the way states treat alcohol, or pharmaceuticals, or anything else society decided is useful but cannot be left to run open.

The control point makes the analogy literal. The EU AI Act already sets obligations for models trained above ten to the twenty-fifth floating-point operations. US reporting rules attach to similar training thresholds. Compute is the chosen lever for a reason. It is detectable, it is excludable, it is countable. So is a controlled substance. You can see it, you can restrict who gets it, you can measure the dose. The plumbing for a licensed, metered AI economy is not a future proposal. It is being installed now, one state bill and one compute threshold at a time.

Now the honest objection, because there is a good one. The industry says it will pay its own way. In March, the big developers signed a pledge to cover the full cost of the new power they need, and California, Ohio, and Utah have started writing that into law. If they fund their own generation, where is the problem.

The problem is that this concedes the point. The moment a cost is separately metered, allocated, and legislated, it stops being a free input and becomes a regulated one. A voluntary pledge is the soft version of a license, the industry writing its own rules before someone less friendly writes them instead. The other objection, that efficiency will outrun demand, runs into a century of evidence. Cheaper energy has never reduced total use. It expands it. Every gain in compute efficiency gets spent on more compute. The hinge does not stop squeaking. We just oil more hinges.

Two facts most coverage skips, because they decide who is right. First, the energy hog is not the dramatic training run everyone pictures. The UN report estimates 80 to 90 percent of AI energy goes to everyday use, the billions of small queries. What gets regulated is not a handful of giant labs. It is the ordinary act of using AI at scale. Second, the money has already committed. Big tech has staked roughly a trillion dollars on buildout against a public that is turning. That collision is not a debate anymore. It is a date on the calendar.

So the era of unlimited, unaccounted AI is closing, and from the most boring direction imaginable. Not a treaty on machine consciousness. A line item on a power bill in Ohio.

If you are building or buying AI, do one thing this quarter. Stop asking only whether it works, and start asking whether you can account for it. What it costs to run, what it draws, what its agents did and why. Treat that as a procurement requirement now, while it is still your choice and not yet a condition of your license.

Because of what AI might become. Not a free utility you plug in and forget, but something closer to a controlled substance. Useful, in demand, and increasingly sold under supervision. Licensed at the source, metered by the dose, available mainly to those who can show what they did with it. We have done this before with everything society decided was too powerful to leave unwatched, from alcohol to medicine to money itself. AI could be next in that line. If it is, the companies that come through will not be the ones holding the most powerful model. They will be the ones holding the paperwork.

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AI agents & Marketplaces are like Ryanair & Legacy Airlines

The classifieds marketplace is like a hub airport. The AI agents are the equivalent of a low cost carrier like Ryanair opening up point to point connections. And unlike legacy airlines, the marketplace has no long-haul business to retreat into.

For thirty years the classifieds business has worked like a flag carrier and its hub and spoke system. A buyer and a seller cannot find each other on their own, so both are routed through one expensive centre. The portal owns the connection and charges the agent, the dealer, the private seller for the privilege of being where everyone changes planes. The model held because there was no way to fly direct. Then the low-cost carriers like Southwest, Ryanair, AirAsia, and many more showed up, flew city pair to city pair, skipped the hub, and the premium for the connection collapsed. AI agents are that direct route for the marketplace.

Applying this analogy to marketplaces three things follow:

First, the marketplace is structurally a hub, and the margin gives it away. For example here in Switzerland, the Swiss Marketplace Group reported CHF 332 million in revenue for 2025 at a 54.3 percent adjusted EBITDA margin, with guidance toward the low-to-mid sixties. Real estate alone runs near a 60 percent segment margin, automotive near 66. A business does not earn a 60 percent margin on the cost of running servers. It earns it on the cost of changing planes. That margin exists because the buyer had no way to reach the seller without passing through the centre.

Second, the agent is the direct flight, and it already flies. It can read every listing across every portal, contact the sellers, compare, and come back with three options while the human is still making coffee. This is not a 2030 thought experiment. OpenAI shipped Instant Checkout in September 2025. Perplexity launched buying inside the chat with PayPal in November. Google announced its own commerce protocol in January 2026. eMarketer expects AI platforms to drive roughly 21 billion dollars of US retail spending in 2026, close to four times the year before. Once the matching moves to the agent, the reason to route through the centre goes with it.

Third, and this is where the analogy turns against the marketplace, the flag carriers survived the low-cost attack because they had a business the budget airlines could not take. Long-haul. Frankfurt to Singapore needs a wide-body, a global network, slots, and capital. Ryanair was never going to fly it. That protected territory kept Lufthansa alive while its short-haul margins were cut to the bone. The classifieds platform has no long-haul. Every route it flies is short, point-to-point matching between a local buyer and a local seller, the one thing the agent does best. No intercontinental segment to retreat into, no protected business the agent cannot reach. The whole network is exposed.

The clearest signal comes from the incumbents. SMG will put an ImmoScout24 app inside ChatGPT in the second half of 2026 and is building agentic features for its agents and dealers. The most valuable classifieds operator in Switzerland is voluntarily placing a door to its own inventory inside someone else’s agent. Amazon went the other way and sued Perplexity to keep external agents off its marketplace. Opening a gate at the low-cost terminal, or building a wall around the hub, are different bets. Both price the agent as a threat to the fee, not a feature.

None of this kills the marketplace. Flag carriers still fly and Frankfurt is still busy. What goes is the captive premium for the connection. The discovery toll at the top of the funnel, the lead, the listing slot, the advertising the portal sold because it owned attention, is the fee an agent routes around first. What is left is thinner and harder to defend. The trust, the verified inventory, the closing of a deal a human still wants a human for.

The hub did not lose its premium because the low-cost carriers were clever. It lost it because the connection stopped being scarce. AI just made the connection cheap, allowing for a disruption of any such marketplace.

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A Stress Diagram Cannot Be Scraped

A stress diagram cannot be scraped. A hardness indentation cannot be prompted. That is the entire moat.

For three years the enterprise AI conversation has been about the model. Bigger, better, cheaper. That conversation is finished. Every serious player has access to roughly the same frontier models. Switching between them is a configuration change. The question that matters in 2026 is the one Gartner put on the table. By 2028, eighty percent of the software tools used to build AI applications will be built around context engineering, not prompting. The model is the commodity. The context is the moat.

If you run IT or engineering at an industrial manufacturer, that has a specific consequence. The companies that win the next five years are not the ones with the cleverest prompts. They are the ones that pair AI expertise with deep industrial expertise. Three layers, three different kinds of skill, one stack. The test machine that produces the raw measurement. The lab data system that gives it structure. The conversational workflow agent that drives the next step. None of these layers can be replaced by a model.

Three reasons this is the new shape of the moat.

First, tokens are interchangeable, context is not. The same foundation models are available to every competitor in your category. What changes the answer is what the model knows about your specific lab, your specific parts, your specific failure modes, your spec sheets going back twenty years. McKinsey’s QuantumBlack team put it plainly this year. The durable advantage from AI is organizational intelligence and domain expertise that lives in people and operations. General purpose models do not carry that. They never will.

Second, the physical world is the hardest context to fake. You cannot scrape a stress diagram from the open web. You cannot prompt a hardness indentation into existence. The same is true for a fatigue cycle, a torque curve, a vibration trace, a thermal profile. These are signals generated at the machine by industrial OEMs that have spent decades engineering what the signal means. IBM estimates around ninety percent of the data produced by sensors and telemetry is never used. The data exists. It sits on a controller, in a log file, in a PDF report nobody opened. The reason most AI projects in industrial labs stall is not the model. It is that the model has no relationship with the floor.

Third, structure plus workflow turns the signal into a decision. A raw test result without sample lineage, method, operator, batch, and spec is noise. The lab data layer turns that noise into a queryable graph. The conversational workflow agent on top runs the loop end to end. Ask the question, get the answer, trigger the next step, write back to the system of record. This is the part that gets missed in most “AI inside LIMS” announcements. A chatbot inside one system answers questions about what is inside that one system. A workflow agent that spans the machine, the lab data, the ERP, and the engineering archive is a different category. Gartner has said where this goes. By 2028, most enterprises will abandon assistive AI for outcome focused workflow. The chatbot phase is ending. The agent phase is starting.

Two contrarian reads worth taking seriously.

The model camp argues that we are one or two generations from a frontier model so capable that the stack work I just described becomes irrelevant. Just wait. Two things make me doubt this. Scaling gains are flattening, and switching models is the cheapest line item in any AI program. And no model however large can read a stress diagram it has never been connected to, on a machine it has never been wired into, in a lab whose taxonomy it has never been taught. The physical floor is not a token problem. It is a wiring problem.

The lab data camp argues that many LIMS vendors are embedding AI chatbots in their 2026 releases, so why bring a third party in. The honest answer is that one chatbot inside one system is not the moat. The moat is the cross system stack. Machine plus lab data plus workflow agent plus the rest of the enterprise. That is three or four kinds of expertise no single vendor has, and no single model can substitute for.

This is the model Squirro has been building toward. We are not the LIMS. We are not the test machine vendor. The agent framework, the knowledge graph layer, the privacy controls, the on prem deployment. All of it exists because the moat sits in the connection between AI and the physical world. We work with industrial manufacturers like Bühler on agent workflows for manufacturing. We run knowledge systems for industrial groups like Henkel across more than forty five data sources. The same logic applies in the lab. When the machine vendor, the lab data vendor, and the workflow agent each bring their own expertise to the same stack, the result is something none of them could ship alone.

Three questions to ask before the next budget cycle. Where does the data from each test machine actually live, and how much of it never reaches a system of record. Which system of record is the source of truth, and what is missing from it. What workflow would you want to run across all three layers, if the conversation could span them. The answers are the shape of your moat for the next five years.

The companies that come out ahead are not the ones with the biggest model. They are the ones who pair AI expertise with the people who built the machines, the people who structured the data, and the people who know what a good answer looks like on the lab floor. That combination is hard. That is exactly why it lasts.

If you run lab IT or engineering at an industrial manufacturer, take thirty minutes with Squirro on what the three layer stack looks like for your specific test data. dorian@squirro.com.

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Magnifica Humanitas: The Pope Just Audited the AI Industry

I read Pope Leo XIV’s first encyclical the way you would read an audit of your own company. Not as a religious text. I read it as a practitioner.

On 25 May, the Pope presented his first encyclical in person, a break with tradition, and stood next to Chris Olah, co-founder of Anthropic. Olah told the room that every frontier AI lab, including his own, operates inside incentives that can pull against doing the right thing. He said the field needs people outside those incentives. People willing to say hard things. That is a co-founder of one of the major labs publicly endorsing the pope’s message.

Most coverage missed it. The press settled on three angles. The Pope warns about AI. The Pope takes aim at big tech. The Pope makes AI ethics a religious matter. All three are true. None of them is useful if you build, sell, or buy this technology for a living.

If you read as an audit, three things stand out. Each one names what the industry already knows and rarely admits.

One. The design problem.

Paragraph 98 says current AI systems are more cultivated than built. Even the people who build them have a limited understanding of how they work. Internal representations and computational processes, as the text puts it, remain unknown.

That is what the interpretability literature already says about itself. A 2024 review concludes that complete understanding of frontier systems should not be expected. A 2026 paper documents a knowledge to action gap. We can sometimes see what is happening inside a model and still cannot correct what it does.

The Pope did not invent that critique. He read what the field publishes about itself and put it in plain language.

For a practitioner, that costs something. When a customer asks how a model arrived at a decision, the honest answer is closer to “we cultivated it” than “we engineered it.” The regulator and the enterprise buyer are about to start expecting that answer.

Two. The governance problem.

Paragraph 107 says a more moral AI is not enough if that morality is determined by a few. Alignment, run as a closed project inside the labs themselves, does not stand up to the question of who decided.

Olah said the same thing in different words. External oversight. Outside voices. People willing to say hard things. From the co-founder of one of the largest labs in the world.

The EU AI Act becomes fully applicable on 2 August 2026. Three months from now. High risk AI systems will require third party conformity assessment before deployment. General purpose models with systemic risk already face disclosure obligations on training data.

The Pope, the AI lab co-founder, and the regulator are saying the same thing: External oversight is not a religious request. It is the operating mode for save AI deployment whether we want it or not. For us as practitioners, that is not a debate to win. It is a deadline.

Three. The supply chain problem.

Paragraph 173 says nothing in the world of AI is immaterial or magical. Every fast clean answer rests on a chain of work. Data labelers. Content moderators. Miners of rare earths. Often young, often women, often working for very little.

The numbers are public. Kenyan data labelers report earning about two dollars an hour. Comparable workers in the United States earn more than twenty. In February 2025, Kenyan labelers formed the Data Labelers Association, the first organized labor body for this workforce. Lawsuits against Meta over moderator working conditions are active in Spain, Kenya, and Ghana.

The industry treats this as a PR problem. The Pope treats it as what decides whether the technology is legitimate at all. A due diligence reviewer would flag it in the first hour of a data room. We can fix this. Yet we can also ignore it and watch a customer or investor read paragraph 173 back to you with a red pen in hand.

One counterargument is worth naming. Slowing down kills the industry. Disarming AI is a euphemism for losing to China. The encyclical does not say stop. Paragraph 110 says to disarm does not mean rejecting technology, but preventing it from dominating humanity, and freeing it from monopolistic control. The competitive position to worry about is the one built on a labor chain or a governance model that does not survive the next regulator reading the next paragraph.

So what to do? Three thoughts:

When you describe how your model works, tell the truth about what is cultivated and what is engineered. The buyers and regulators who matter will respect honesty more than another launch deck.

Treat external governance as a product feature, not a tax. Build for the third party conformity assessment that lands 2 August. The labs and vendors that arrive early will set the standard.

Make your supply chain visible. Audit data labeling, model training, and content moderation. Pay it like the work it is. Publish what you find. This is the part of the job that turns into a lawsuit if you wait.

The Pope read our industry better than most of our boards would put on paper. The mistake is to read him back as a sermon. Read him as a good knowledgeable auditor.

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Buy the Workflow, not the Agent

If you are buying an agent platform in 2026, you are buying a rebuild in 2027. A few early indicators paint the following picture:

  • Gartner, June 2025: over 40% of agentic AI projects will be canceled by end of 2027 for cost, value, or risk-control reasons.
  • IDC: 88% of agent proofs of concept never reach production.
  • Deloitte: 89% pilot-to-production failure.
  • MIT NANDA, August 2025, was the bluntest. 5% of generative AI pilots deliver business impact. 95% stall.

The agent is not the problem; the architecture around it is.

An agent has three things missing. No scope, no contract, no audit trail. The model can do anything its tools allow. The toolset gets defined by whoever set up the agent that morning. The trace is the chat transcript. That is not a system. That is a sandbox. Risk, legal, and compliance read it the same way.

47% of CISOs in 2025 said they had watched an agent do something it was not supposed to do. 96% of leaders want a unified AI governance platform. 7% have one. That gap is the procurement ceiling for agent-only stacks. They do not get through.

A workflow has the three missing things baked in. Steps, owners, and conditions are defined. Plug an agent into a step and the agent inherits the bounds of the step. Governance lives at the workflow layer. You cannot govern what you cannot bound.

BPOs proved this thirty years ago

A 328-billion-dollar industry is built on one observation: Humans are non-deterministic, and that is fine, as long as you wrap them inside a deterministic workflow. Predictable in, predictable out. Accenture runs that pattern across financial reconciliation. Genpact runs Cora across supply chain and finance. MIT confirmed it last year. The biggest generative AI returns come from back-office work, cutting BPO and agency spend. The pattern now puts agents in the role humans used to play. Same boxes. Different occupants. Working software.

AI is like WD40. It does not replace the machine. It makes stuck systems move again. Spray it on a hinge that has no door behind it, and you get an oily floor. Spray it inside a workflow that already moves work through a building, and the whole place runs faster.

So what do you buy in 2026

You buy a workflow platform that uses agents. Not an agent platform that hopes to become a workflow. Three questions for any vendor sitting across from you. One, where does the workflow live, and who owns the definition. Two, how is each step audited, by whom, against which policy. Three, when the model behind an agent changes underneath you, what breaks, and what stays the same. If the vendor cannot answer all three on a whiteboard in under ten minutes, the procurement risk is yours, not theirs.

The agentic AI conversation has been theatrical for two years. Demos, framework wars, manifestos. The production data is now doing the sorting. CIOs who buy the workflow win the next budget cycle. CIOs who buy the agent rewrite their stack in eighteen months.

That is the question worth asking before you sign anything in Q3/4.

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The Regulator nobody lobbied against

The AI industry spends big on lobbying. OpenAI’s CEO personally argued against safety regulations and transparency requirements. The industry’s message was consistent. Regulation will kill innovation. A patchwork of state laws will fragment compliance. Let us self-regulate.

They possibly were fighting the wrong fight.

In January 2026, ISO (ISO stands for Insurance Services Office . For Rest of the World readers: not be confused with the International Organization for Standardization), the organization whose standardized forms underpin 82% of US property and casualty insurance policies, introduced two new endorsements. CG 40 47 excludes AI-related liability from bodily injury and personal injury coverage. CG 40 48 excludes AI-related personal and advertising injury. These are not proposals. They are live policy language that carriers can adopt immediately.

And they are adopting it. In the US: WR Berkley, Cincinnati Financial, Frederick Mutual, and Philadelphia Insurance have all filed their own AI exclusion wordings. Philadelphia Indemnity now excludes coverage for any claim involving generative AI-created content. Hamilton Select excludes any claim involving generative AI use, period. The same happens elsewhere in the world too.

This is what regulation looks like when it does not come from a legislature.

The mechanism is simple. Without liability insurance, a business cannot get a bank loan. Banks require it. Without a certificate of insurance showing adequate coverage, a business cannot become a vendor for any large enterprise. Procurement departments require it. Without coverage, a business in a regulated sector, banking, healthcare, manufacturing, cannot operate at all.

No amount of lobbying changes what an insurer writes into a contract. There is no congressional hearing, no public comment period, no executive order. An underwriter in Hartford or London looks at the risk, decides the price, and sets the terms. If the risk is too uncertain to price, they exclude it. Done.

We have seen this before. Cyber insurance is the template. In the early 2010s, companies treated cybersecurity as optional. Then insurers started requiring specific controls as conditions of coverage. Multi-factor authentication. Endpoint detection. Encrypted backups. Incident response plans. Companies that did not comply simply could not get insured. Within five years, the industry self-regulated, not because of any law, but because of a market mechanism that made noncompliance economically impossible.

The environmental liability precedent is even more dramatic. When insurers pulled coverage for asbestos-related claims in the 1980s, it effectively killed the industry. Companies that could not get insured could not operate. The market accomplished in a few years what regulators had struggled with for decades.

The EU adds a second front. The revised Product Liability Directive now extends strict liability to AI systems. Developers and importers are liable for harms without having to prove negligence. That liability has to be insured or absorbed. For most companies, absorbing it is not an option. They need coverage. And coverage now comes with conditions, or does not come at all.

Three things this means.

  • First, stop watching, in the US Washington instead of Hartford. In the rest of the world figure out where the ISO equivalent sits. The regulatory action that will actually change your AI operations is coming from insurance underwriters, not legislators.
  • Second, check your existing policies now. If your carrier has adopted the AI exclusions, your general liability coverage may already have a gap you have not noticed.
  • Third, build governance before you are forced to. The cyber insurance playbook is clear. Companies that had controls in place before insurers required them got better terms. Companies that scrambled after the fact paid more, got less coverage, and lost contracts while they caught up.

The AI industry spent millions lobbying against regulation that legislators had not even written yet. Meanwhile, the regulation that actually matters was and is being written by actuaries.


Sources:

  • ISO AI exclusion endorsements (CG 40 47, CG 40 48): Independent Agent/Verisk (2026)
  • Carrier AI exclusion filings: Zelle Law (2026)
  • Cyber insurance precedent: Stimson Center (2024), UCI Law
  • EU Product Liability Directive: MIT/Harvard Digital Society Review
  • AI lobbying spend: Nature (2024), MIT Technology Review (2025)
  • Insurance as regulation mechanism: Modulos AI, NBC News
  • Regulatory markets framework: Schwartz Reisman Institute, University of Toronto

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The Token Tax

Every time an AI model gets called, GPU cycles get burned. GPUs cost 6-8x more per operation than traditional CPU compute. That is structural, and right now it is mostly hidden to everyday (enterprise) users.

OpenAI projects a cash burn of $25 billion in 2026 and $57 billion in 2027. They burn $2 for every $1 they earn on inference. Anthropic runs a similar ratio, burning roughly $3 billion a year against $5 billion in annualized revenue (Though being private and with the most recent Claude Code success the top line numbers might be different). Both companies are selling tokens below cost. The difference is covered by venture capital. OpenAI alone needs $665 billion in cumulative capital through 2030, with break-even not expected before then.

This is not a business model. It is a price war funded by other people’s money.

The question rarely asked: What happens when the subsidy ends?

Token prices have dropped aggressively. Anthropic cut Opus pricing by 67% in a single release. OpenAI launched budget tiers at $0.05 per million input tokens. The industry is racing to the bottom on price while racing to the top on cost. This math does not work forever.

The compounding problem is agentic workflows. A single user request that triggers an AI agent does not make one API call. It makes ten or twenty. The agent reasons, checks, iterates, calls tools, and reasons again. Each loop burns tokens. Enterprise AI budgets now spend 85% on inference alone, up from 55% two years ago. Even if the per-token price drops, the per-task cost keeps climbing because the number of tokens per task is exploding.

Here is where it gets uncomfortable. 84% of companies already report measurable gross margin erosion from AI infrastructure costs. 26% report erosion above 16%. And 90% of CIOs say cost management is limiting the value they can extract from AI. This is happening at subsidized prices. At real prices, the numbers get worse.

Think about which use cases survive a 3-5x price increase. Enterprise decision support where a single AI-assisted analysis saves a million-dollar mistake? That survives. A customer service chatbot handling routine queries at $0.002 per conversation? That probably survives. But the long tail of AI features bolted onto SaaS products, the auto-summarizers, the AI-generated email drafts, the routine code completion, these are built on cheap tokens. When tokens stop being cheap, these features either get cut or their costs get passed to users who may not value them enough to pay.

The counterargument is efficiency. NVIDIA’s Blackwell GPUs deliver 50x better token output per watt than the previous generation. Google’s TPU v7 claims a 4x improvement with 67% better energy efficiency. Custom silicon can reduce inference costs by 40-60% compared to general-purpose GPUs. These gains are real. The question is whether they arrive fast enough to offset the demand growth from agentic workloads that multiply token consumption per task by 10-20x.

Three things to watch. First, track your cost per business outcome, not your cost per token. A cheaper token that gets used twenty times per task is not cheaper. Second, identify which of your AI use cases are viable at 3x current token prices. If the answer is “none of them,” you have a subsidy dependency, not a strategy. Third, watch the funding rounds. When the next OpenAI or Anthropic raise comes with down-round terms or profitability conditions, the price war ends and the repricing begins.

The venture capital subsidy on AI compute is the largest indirect price support in the history of enterprise software. It will not last. The businesses that planned for real costs will be fine. The ones that built on subsidized tokens will learn the same lesson every business learns when someone else stops paying part of the bill.

Sources

  • OpenAI burn rate projections: Medium, “The Burn Rate Crisis” (2026)
  • Anthropic revenue and burn rate: Finout (2026)
  • Token pricing comparison: Finout, “OpenAI vs Anthropic API Pricing” (2026)
  • Agentic inference cost growth: AnalyticsWeek, “Inference Economics” (2026)
  • Margin erosion data: CloudZero, “State of AI Costs” (2025)
  • NVIDIA Blackwell efficiency: NVIDIA blog
  • Google TPU v7: AI Ireland (2026)

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The Paradox Is back

In 1987, Robert Solow looked at two decades of corporate IT investment and wrote one of the most quoted lines in economics. “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”

Nearly forty years later, replace “computer” with “AI” and the sentence still works.

US nonfarm labor productivity grew 2.2% in 2025, down from 3.0% the year before. Total factor productivity sat at 0.8%. A study of CEOs found 90% reporting no measurable productivity impact from AI. Apollo’s chief economist put it plainly. “You don’t see AI in the employment data, productivity data, or inflation data.” Meanwhile, companies increased AI spending by 85% in a single year. $203 billion in venture funding flowed into AI startups. And the economy barely moved.

We have spent the last seven posts in this series explaining why. Each one, it turns out, describes a different reason the productivity statistics stay flat.

The faster horse problem. Most companies use AI to do existing work faster, not to create new economic value. A process that took ten hours now takes six. That is a 40% improvement inside the firm. But if the output is the same, GDP does not register it as growth. Productivity statistics measure output, not speed. When you accelerate the old process instead of building a new one, the numbers do not move.

The belt-and-shaft problem. Organizations have not reorganized around AI. They bolted it onto the existing layout, the same way factories bolted electric motors onto steam-era floor plans. Erik Brynjolfsson, who first formalized the Solow Paradox in 1993, now describes a “Productivity J-Curve.” When a general-purpose technology arrives, productivity actually dips before it rises. The dip happens because the real gains require reorganization, and reorganization is expensive, slow, and painful. The original computer paradox took a full decade to resolve, from 1987 to the mid-1990s. We may be in year two of a similar curve with AI.

The TikTok AI problem. Investment goes to demos, not to production. 80% of AI projects fail to deliver value. 95% of generative AI pilots never scale. The money is flowing, but it is flowing into experiments that do not reach the point where they affect output statistics. You cannot measure the productivity impact of a pilot that was abandoned after 14 months.

The job title problem. Organizations delegate AI to a role instead of redesigning operations. The Chief AI Officer gets a mandate but not the authority to change how the business actually works. Result: technology adoption without process change. The numbers reflect this. 75% of measured AI productivity gains are concentrated in 20% of firms. The ones that redesigned. The other 80% adopted AI and changed nothing structural.

The token tax problem. The economics are subsidized. Companies are building on artificially cheap compute, which means the cost side of the productivity equation is distorted. When 84% of companies report margin erosion from AI infrastructure, the net productivity impact, output minus input, shrinks even where output improves.

The recomposition problem. The real value of AI is not inside individual firms. It is in how firm boundaries and value chains get recomposed. But GDP measures what happens inside national boundaries through existing accounting categories. When a BPO firm shifts from selling headcount to selling outcomes, when a manufacturer stops owning a warehouse because AI-coordinated logistics made it unnecessary, those shifts are structural. They change where value sits, but the statistical framework was not built to capture value migration across organizational boundaries in real time.

So the paradox is real, but it is not mysterious. It has specific, identifiable causes. And every one of them is fixable.

The original Solow Paradox resolved when three things happened at once:

  • Hardware got cheap enough for broad deployment.
  • Organizations finally reorganized around the technology instead of layering it onto old structures.
  • And a generation of managers who understood the technology natively entered decision-making roles. All three took roughly a decade.

For AI, the hardware is already cheap, arguably too cheap given the subsidies. The organizational redesign is barely starting. And the generational shift in management thinking is years away.

Three implications.

First, do not use the flat productivity numbers to argue that AI does not work. It works. The problem is that most organizations are not doing the work that makes the gains visible at scale.

Second, do not wait for the macro statistics to validate your AI strategy. By the time productivity data catches up, the companies that reorganized early will have a structural advantage that is very difficult to close.

Third, reread the previous posts in this series. Each one describes a specific failure mode that keeps AI out of the productivity numbers. Fix those, and you will not need to wait for the paradox to resolve itself. You will be the resolution.

Sources

  • Solow original quote: New York Times Book Review (1987)
  • US productivity data: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2025)
  • CEO productivity survey: Fortune, “CEOs Admit AI Had No Impact” (2026)
  • Apollo economist quote: Torsten Slok
  • AI contribution to GDP: St. Louis Fed, “Tracking AI’s Contribution to GDP Growth” (2026)
  • Productivity J-Curve: Brynjolfsson et al., NBER Working Paper 24001
  • Gain concentration (75%/20%): PwC (2026)
  • McKinsey, “Is the Solow Paradox Back?” (2025)
  • MIT Sloan, “A Calm Before the AI Productivity Storm”

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The big Recomposition

In the previous posts I argued that most companies think about AI linearly. Make the process faster. But keep the layout the same. Bolt the electric motor onto the old belt-and-shaft system and call it AI-progress.

But there is a bigger question that almost nobody is asking. What if AI does not just change how work gets done inside your company? What if it changes why your company is shaped the way it is?

Oliver Williamson won the Nobel Prize in 2009 for a deceptively simple insight. Companies exist because coordinating work internally is cheaper than buying it from the market. That is it. The boundary of any firm sits wherever the cost of doing something yourself becomes higher than the cost of getting someone else to do it.

Those costs have specific names. Search costs, finding the right supplier or partner. Monitoring costs, making sure they deliver quality. Coordination costs, managing handoffs across organizations. Contracting costs, negotiating and enforcing terms. Every company you have ever worked at is shaped by these four forces. The departments that exist, the functions that are in-house, the work that gets outsourced. All of it traces back to where those costs tip.

AI just tipped them all at once.

No previous technology did this. The telegraph reduced search costs. You could find a supplier in another city without traveling there. Containerization reduced coordination costs. Standardized boxes replaced custom loading at every port. The internet reduced distribution costs. You could sell directly without a physical storefront. Each technology moved one or two cost categories and reshaped one or two industries as a result.

AI hits all four simultaneously. It reduces search costs because an agent can scan, compare, and qualify suppliers in minutes. It reduces monitoring costs because machine-audited quality checks replace manual inspection. It reduces coordination costs because protocol-based integration replaces bilateral negotiation. It reduces contracting costs because automated compliance tracking shrinks the surface area for disputes.

When all four drop at the same time, firm boundaries do not just shift. They recompose. Functions that companies kept internal because market coordination was too expensive suddenly become cheaper to buy. And functions that were outsourced suddenly become worth bringing back inside, because AI made internal coordination cheap enough to justify full control.

Both movements happen simultaneously. That is what makes this different from a simple outsourcing wave or a simple insourcing trend. It is a recomposition. The pieces come apart and go back together in a different configuration. Same LEGO bricks, different structure.

You can see it happening now in three places.

In outsourced services, the BPO industry is being recomposed. FTE-based pricing, paying for headcount, dropped from 42% of contracts to 28% in three years. Outcome-based pricing, paying for results, grew from 20% to 39%. The relationship between buyer and provider is being redrawn because AI made it cheap enough to monitor outcomes instead of supervising people. The BPO firm that used to sell labor is becoming a firm that sells completed work. That is not an improvement to the old model. It is a different business.

In manufacturing supply chains, AI-driven demand sensing and real-time quality monitoring are changing which parts of the supply chain companies own and which they contract. When you can monitor a supplier’s output quality in real time through machine inspection, the case for vertical integration weakens. When you can coordinate just-in-time delivery across dozens of suppliers through automated scheduling, you no longer need to own the warehouse. The transaction cost that justified the old structure disappeared.

In professional services, legal research, financial analysis, compliance screening. These functions existed inside large firms partly because the cost of finding, coordinating, and monitoring external specialists was too high. AI is collapsing those costs. The result is not that law firms or banks shrink. It is that the boundary between what they do internally and what they source externally is moving. New specialist firms emerge to serve functions that used to require an in-house team. Old generalist providers lose work that gets absorbed back into the client organization.

The trap is thinking about this as “transformation,” a word that implies the same company changes shape over time. What is actually happening is faster and more structural. The economics that determined why your company has the shape it has are shifting underneath you. Departments that exist because coordination with the outside was too expensive may no longer need to exist. Partners you outsourced to because internal capacity was too costly may no longer be the right answer either.

Three questions:

  • First, list the functions you keep in-house. For each one, ask whether the transaction costs that justify internal ownership have actually changed. If AI made external coordination 5x cheaper, does the function still belong inside?
  • Second, list what you outsource. For each one, ask whether AI has made internal coordination cheap enough to bring it back. Sometimes the right move is the opposite of what you expect.
  • Third, look at where your industry boundaries are drawn. Companies that see recomposition coming will redraw their own boundaries first. Companies that do not will have the boundaries redrawn for them.

This is not about making your company faster. It is about whether your company is still shaped for the economics it operates in. The pieces are the same. The structure they fit into is not.

Sources:

  • Williamson/Coase framework: California Management Review, “From Coase to AI Agents” (2025)
  • Oliver Williamson Nobel Perspectives: UBS
  • AI and transaction cost reduction: Labor Market Matters, “AI, Transaction Costs, and Self-Employment”
  • BPO recomposition data (FTE to outcome pricing): a16z, “Unbundling the BPO”; FirstSource, “Future BPO Services”
  • Fluid firm boundaries: Raktim Singh, “The Fluid Boundary of the AI-Era Firm”
  • AI as coordination-compressing capital: arXiv 2602.16078
  • Healthcare AI transaction cost framework: arXiv 2604.16465

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Transformation is not a Job Title

The average Chief Digital Officer lasts 31 months. Shortest tenure in the C-suite, falling every year. 75% leave the company entirely when they go, not sideways into another role, out the door. Nearly half of CDOs themselves describe the position as a “revolving door.”

This is what happens when you try to solve a structural problem with a job title.

Digitization was supposed to transform businesses. What it mostly did was express existing processes digitally. Paper forms became PDF forms. Catalogs became websites. Manual approval chains became automated approval chains with exactly the same steps, the same bottlenecks, and the same logic. The container changed. The content did not.

The numbers confirm this. 70% of digital transformation projects failed to deliver their intended outcomes. $2.3 trillion in global spending, and most organizations got stuck at step one. Converting analog to digital. Not rethinking the business model. Not questioning which processes should exist. Just scanning the paper and calling it innovation.

Now the same playbook is being applied to AI. Hire a Chief AI Officer. Give them a mandate. Watch the revolving door spin again.

Gartner expects 35% of large enterprises to have a Chief AI Officer by now. 48% of FTSE 100 companies already have one, with 65% appointed in the last two years. The US government mandated the role at all federal agencies. But Harvard Business Review already published the warning. Chief Data and AI Officers are “set up to fail” through the same structural problems that killed the CDO. Poor alignment. Unclear mandate. No real authority over business processes. A technology title grafted onto a business problem.

The distinction matters. Digitization asked one question. How do I express this process digitally? AI asks a different one. Should this process exist at all? You cannot answer the second question from an office that reports to the CTO. You cannot answer it with a team of data scientists who have no authority over how the business actually operates. You cannot answer it with a 31-month runway before the next person walks through the revolving door.

The CDO role failed not because the people in it were bad. It failed because transformation is not a role. It is an operating model change. It requires rethinking how decisions get made, how teams are structured, how value flows through the organization, and who has authority to redesign processes end to end. No single hire can do that, no matter what you put on the business card.

Three things this means in practice:

  • First, stop hiring for transformation. Start redesigning for it. If your AI strategy depends on one person with a title, it is not a strategy. It is a prayer.
  • Second, look at the mandate, not the role. Does your AI lead have authority over business processes, or just over tools? If they can choose the model but not change the workflow, you have a technology advisor, not a transformation leader.
  • Third, measure tenure against outcome. If your AI leadership turns over every two years, the problem is not the people. It is the job.

The revolving door will keep spinning as long as organizations believe that transformation is something you delegate to a title. It is not. It is something you build into how the company works.

Sources:

  • CDO tenure data: DigitalDefynd, IMD
  • HBR, “Why Chief Data and AI Officers Are Set Up to Fail” (2023)
  • Digital transformation failure rate: CIO Magazine
  • CAIO adoption: Gartner, SearchSVC
  • FTSE 100 CAIO data: SearchSVC (2025)

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